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IBTRODOCTION 
There is an increasing potential for severe accidents as the 
industrial development tends towards large, centralised produc-
tion units. In several industries this has led to the formation 
of large organisations which are prepared for accident fighting 
and emergency management. The functioning of these organisations 
critically depends upon efficient decision making and exchange of 
information1'. 
The staff in charge are faced with decisions which: 
- must be made relatively quickly, 
involve complex judgements, 
involve making trade-offs between partly incompatible 
demands, 
must be based on technical data that are difficult to 
access, 
involve many decision makers and experts. 
It is a commonly shared belief that timely and correct decisions 
in these situations could either prevent an incident from deve-
loping into a severe accident or mitigate the negative consequen-
ces of an accident. It is also a commonly shared belief that in 
those cases where poor decisions have been made it has been 
because of insufficient access to information and expert know-
ledge during the decision making process. 
Problems observed within emergency preparedness organisations 
during drills or by analysis of accidental situations, e.g., in 
nuclear power plants, are omissions, confusion, and misunderstan-
dings. Especially in the minutes just after the occurrence of an 
accident, operators may make the accident worse by taking pre-
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clpitate action under the stress of the emergency. This happened 
at Three Mile Island2). 
The problems can be divided into at least three different catego-
ries. The first category is of technical nature and is associated 
with communications, the second one is related to decision making 
and the interdependence between tactical and strategical de-
cisions, while the third category has to do with the understand-
ing of information that is communicated. 
The technical problems can be caused by anything from an 
overload of the equipment used to difficulties in handling 
these devices. This may result in delays with consequently 
less time for decision making, or - even worse - mixing up 
the order of events. 
The interdependence between tactical decisions regarding 
information management and the strategic decisions related 
to the appropriate protective actions has been seen to cause 
problems. As an example the staff in the on-site emergency 
organisation centre (EOC), who make most of the decisions 
regarding the information flow to the off-site organisation, 
are primarily occupied with the accident management task; 
therefore, e.g., lack of man-power may result in insuf-
ficient or unclear information. This will certainly have a 
negative influence on the strategic decisions made by the 
off-site organisations as, e.g., the Nuclear Power Inspec-
torate and the county EOC. 
Understanding of communicated information turns out to give 
problems because much of the information from the on-site to 
the off-site EOC is of technical and/or radiological nature, 
and not all personnel involved have this kind of competence. 
In parallel with the development of organisations for emergency 
management, a dramatic development within electronic information 
technology is taking place and, quite naturally, widespread ef-
forts are made to exploit this technology in the design of de-
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cision support systems for operating crews during plant disturb-
ances and accident control, and for support of the general emerg-
ency management organisation. 
OVERVIEW OP THE PROJECT 
The project started as part of the new Nordic programme in 1985 
and is expected to be finished early in 1989. A time schedule is 
given in Figure 1. This gives the structure of the project that 
is started by a pilot phase in whion the existing preparedness 
organisations in the area of nuclear emergency situations have 
been described. Input has been taken from the Loviisa nuclear 
power plant in Finland for the on-site organisation, and from the 
Swedish nuclear preparedness organisation for the off-site orga-
nisation. Results from this phase are used as a basis for de-
cision models to be developed in the main phase for improvement 
of decision making in complex situations. Even though these in-
vestigations have been based on work in the nuclear field, it is 
the intention to adjust the preparedness system to make the re-
sults applicable in the chemical industry as well. Furthermore, 
an expert system overview has been given in this phase3. 
In the main phase a detailed scenario analysis has been performed 
together with a conceptual analysis of dynamic decision making. 
Great efforts have been put into the detailed study of the basic 
functions of information flow, in emphasising the most important 
centres - county EOC and the EOCs at the National Institute of 
Radiation Protection and the Nuclear Power Inspectorate for the 
off-Site organisation/ Plant Emergency Manager for the on-site 
organisation - and in trying to identify the type of information 
transferred between different operational functions in the main 
centres. From this analysis data and knowledge needed to develop 
an effective decision support system have been specified. This 
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has been performed for the off-site and on-site organisations 
separately, and will be presented in more detail elsewhere4)'5). 
Following the specification phase an implementation strategy has 
been selected and implementation has been initiated. Features 
that have been considered to make prototyping fast and incremen-
tal are for instance: easy-to-use and powerful window systems, 
incremental compiling, and help functions at different levels. 
Shortly, the whole system is being built so that it is easy to 
expand the data base, the knowledge, the reasoning mechanism, 
etc.6). 
The aim of this project is not to develop a complete decision 
support system to cope with all aspects of emergency situations, 
but to develop prototype systems to support decision making in 
time slices of emergency situations. 
In total, four different experiments will be performed at four 
different scenarios, two on-site and cwo off-site and, correspon-
dingly, four different prototype systems will be developed to 
support decision making in these situations. The results using 
the prototype systems will be compared with drills using "normal'' 
procedures to demonstrate the advantage of the system. All scena-
rios shall demonstrate detection, diagnosis, formation of plan of 
action, and execution. 
These experiments will provide us with material for empirical 
evaluation of the combined effect of the data base, the implemen-
tation strategy, and the conceptual model for the developed part 
of the decision support system. 
The prototype systems will be optimised by an iterative pro-
cedure, and the final product will be used for recommendations 
and guidelines for a possible further development into a com-
plete decision support system capable of coping with all emerg-
ency situations in risky industrial plants. 
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CONCEPTUAL WORK 
A short presentation of the conceptual work wi;1 be given here7), 
whereas detailed presentations of development of the support 
system off-site and on-site, respectively, including description 
of functions, system, and evaluation have been given separ-
ately4)'5). 
The aim of this work is to develop a general conceptual model for 
different kinds of emergencies, rather than a model for a speci-
fic kind of emergency. 
The starting point is the fact that decision problems are in-
herently complex, and the problem is to find a way to simplify 
problems to a manageable level of complexity. 
In this project three alternative solutions have been discussed: 
Hierarchical organisation. 
Emergency management as a control system. 
Distributed decision making organisation. 
Hierarchical organisation 
To impose a hierarchical system seems directly to meet the re-
quirement mentioned above, as this means to introduce a series of 
descriptions of the system which differ with respect to their 
level of abstraction. This makes it possible to control the level 
of complexity in the sense that only a limited number of units 
have to be considered at each level of the hierarchy. Neverthe-
less, as hierarchical organisations had been analysed in some 
detail, it was found that this form of organisation has conside-
rable problems in the context of emergency managements 
The structure of a hierarchical organisation should be con-
gruent to the structure of problems to be solved. In emerg-
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ency management it is impossible to foresee every kind of 
emergency situations. 
Delays are unavoidable as well in transmission of infor-
mation, receipt of feedback, and execution of commands. 
Therefore, a hierarchical organisation is feasible in a 
relatively stable system, but not in emergency management 
which might be highly dynamic. 
The basic assumption behind the felt need for a hierarchical 
command and control system is that the emergency creates 
total disruption so that a command and control system is 
needed to create some order and to get the social system 
going again. In fact, the results from studies of emerg-
encies suggest that there is no general disruption, and that 
major parts of the social system go on functioning in very 
much the same way as they did before the emergency8). The 
problem for emergency management is then to design a system 
that could aid the processes of co-ordination and self-or-
ganisation, rather than a system for creating a new struc-
ture. 
The conclusion of these considerations is that hierarchical sys-
tems are of limited use in emergency management. 
Emergency Management as a Control System 
The point of view in this context is that emergency management 
can usefully be considered a control system. The purpose of the 
control system is to keep the level of damage and injuries in 
society at some predetermined level, a level whicn. is generally 
not made explicit, but which is nevertheless somehow known to the 
system. 
The control perspective provides two basic control strategies: 
feedback and feedforward, the former being that of returning the 
system to a normal state after some deviation has occurred, while 
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the latter involves an attempt to construct a strategy which 
prevents a deviation from occurring. 
In case of emergency management, it is clear that a feedforward 
strategy is to be preferred. A basic question, is therefore 
whether and under what conditions a feedforward strategy is poss-
ible. 
Needed functions for such a system are that: 
it must be able to detect deviations, 
it must be able to diagnose the cause of these deviations, 
it must be able to return the system to a normal level. 
To make efficient detection, providing possibilities for a 
feedforward system, it is necessary not to detect damage or 
injuries themselves, but to detect variables that cause 
damage or injuries. So, feedforward strategy relies upon 
feedback control of variables related to the damage/injury 
variable. 
Even though it is easy to diagnose the type of emergency, 
the problem of how to diagnose the causes and magnitude of 
new and unfamiliar emergencies is not an easy one. In the 
end, the ability to make correct diagnoses may not rest so 
much with the organisation for emergency management as with 
the general level of scientific development of a society. 
The action side of emergency management can be divided into 
two general classes of activities: damage/injury control and 
relief/ repair operations. In most cases these two classes 
of action will be coupled; therefore, the question is not 
whether the one or the other kind of operation is to be 
chosen, but what is the best mix of actions. 
It is possible to construct time-area diagrams for combinations 
of emergencies and control operations which make it possible to 
understand the nature of various emergencies and the control 
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operations which are possible in different forms of emergencies, 
as well as to judge how much resources should be used, see Figure 
2 as an example with an exponential developing emergency situa-
tion and a linear developing action for emergency fighting. Thus, 
the condition for actually defeat of the emergency is that the 
emergency fighting resources can be manipulated in such a way 
that the fighting function intercepts the emergency function 
before the slope of the latter function exceeds that of the for-
mer function. 
In principle, diagrams of this kind can be used as a form of 
decision support at the county EOC level. However, there are good 
models for computing the actual time-area functions only for a 
limited number of emergencies, e.g., the spread of clouds and 
radiation. For many kinds of emergencies, however, computational 
models will have to be developed. This limits the present useful-
ness of the time-area diagrams as an actual decision support 
tool. Moreover, to be used for decision support, the diagrams 
must be supplemented with some measure of uncertainty. It is not 
clear how such measures can be obtained at present. 
The framework analyses forms of action of different levels of 
abstraction. At the highejt level - the one which is compatible 
with the time-area diagrams mentioned above - there are three 
forms of actions. The first of these involves removing the source 
of the emergency, the second raising a barrier between people and 
the emergency, and the third removing the people from the site of 
the emergency. The time-area diagram will help in the choice of 
action at this level. 
Plfftrlfru*^ Pfcigion MflKing Qgqftn&gflUon 
One of the problems mentioned previously has to do with feedback. 
If feedback is slow compared with the rate of change in the pro-
cess to be controlled, centralised control is impossible and 
control has to be decentralised. This creates problems in the 
case when coordination is needed. This problem has received no 
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attention from organisation theory, so very little is known about 
what sorts of organisation might actually work in a dynamic en-
vironment . 
Recently, the problem of distributed decision making has been 
discussed in military contexts in connection with planning for 
battlefield scenarios involving the loss of communication. One 
idea here has been that of feedforward control by means of doc-
trine. This, however, suffers from the same problem as other 
forms of feedforward control in chaining environments. 
Other problems being considered in the analysis are: 
What is the minimum level of communication needed for co-
ordination? 
What is the minimum level of organisation? 
How are intentions communicated? 
What are the possibilities for self organisation in dynamic 
contexts? 
Evaluation of the Decision Support System 
Evaluation of a decision support system (DSS) may proceed along 
two lines. The first one involves analytical evaluation, the 
second empirical evaluation. 
The first category may be seen as a normative theory which 
specifies the steps necessary for a good decision. The decision 
maker starts by implementing some plan, notices the consequences 
using the DSS, and evaluates them in terms of expectations. 
Finally, decision is made as to whether the result is acceptable 
or not, including the kinds of displays provided, and the knowl-
edge required for understanding these displays. 
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Empirical evaluation is desirable as well, as there are some 
aspects of the evaluation problem that cannot be solved analyti-
cally. 
Two main questions for empirical evaluation are: 
Hill the DSS actually be used? 
When the DSS is used, will the decision be better than when 
it is not used? 
The first of these questions can only be evaluated in the context 
of a total system where different systems compete for the deci-
sion maker's attention, and is outside the scope of this project. 
The second question may be answered for time-slice prototype 
systems, but even here more limited evaluation of some selected 
aspects of the system might be beneficial, not to involve systems 
or decisions not using the DSS being evaluated. 
It is suggested that we start the evaluation process by the ana-
lytical evaluation. This should lead to clarification of the 
nature of the support provided by the DSS. It will make it poss-
ible to design the empirical part of the evaluation process. 
FUTURK FLAMS 
As has been mentioned in the "Overview of the project", the final 
product is recommendations and guidelines for further develop-
ment into a complete decision support system coping with emerg-
ency situations, but it is not our plan to develop such a system. 
By now the NKA/INF project has played a major role and may be 
seen as a preprograrame for an ESPRIT II proposal including par-
ticipants from seven European countries. 
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